U.S. Involvement in the Vietnam War: the Gulf of Tonkin and Escalation, 1964
In early August 1964, two U.S. destroyers stationed in the Gulf of
Tonkin in Vietnam radioed that they had
been fired upon by North Vietnamese forces. In response to these reported
incidents, President Lyndon B. Johnson requested permission
from the U.S. Congress to increase the U.S. military presence in Indochina. On
August 7, 1964, Congress passed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, authorizing
President Johnson to take any measures he believed were necessary to retaliate
and to promote the maintenance of international peace and security in southeast
Asia. This resolution became the legal basis for the Johnson and Nixon
Administrations prosecution of the Vietnam War.
On August 7, 1964, Congress passed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution,
authorizing President Johnson to take any measures he believed were
necessary to retaliate and to promote the maintenance of international
peace and security in southeast Asia.
After the end of the First Indochina War and the Viet Minh defeat of the French
at Dien Bien Phu in 1954, the countries meeting at the
Geneva Conference divided Vietnam into northern and southern halves, ruled by
separate regimes, and scheduled elections to reunite the country under a unified
government. The communists seemed likely to win those elections, thanks mostly
to their superior organization and greater appeal in the countryside. The United
States, however, was dedicated to containing the spread of communist regimes
and, invoking the charter of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (1954),
supported the South Vietnamese leader, Ngo Dinh Diem, when
he refused to hold the elections. Diem held control of the South Vietnamese
Government, but he could not halt the communist infiltration of the South. By
1959, the Viet Cong, South Vietnamese communist guerillas, and the Viet Minh,
began a large scale insurgency in the South that marked the opening of the
Second Indochina War.
Ngo Dinh Diem failed to capture the loyalties of the people of South Vietnam the
way that Ho Chi Minh had done among the population of North
Vietnam. Despite U.S. support, Diem’s rural policies and ambivalent attitude
toward necessary changes like land reform only bolstered support for the Viet
Cong in the southern countryside. By 1963, Diem’s rule had so deteriorated that
he was overthrown and assassinated by several of his generals with the tacit
approval of the Kennedy Administration. Three weeks later, U.S. President
John F. Kennedy was also assassinated, and the war
continued under new leadership in both countries. Before his death, Kennedy had
increased the U.S. advisory presence in South Vietnam in the hopes that a
U.S.-supported program of “nation-building” would strengthen the new South
Vietnamese government. However, South Vietnam continued to experience political
instability and military losses to North Vietnam.
By August, 1964, the Johnson Administration believed that escalation of the U.S.
presence in Vietnam was the only solution. The post-Diem South proved no more
stable than it had been before his ouster, and South Vietnamese troops were
generally ineffective. In addition to supporting on-going South Vietnamese raids
in the countryside and implementing a U.S. program of bombing the Lao border to
disrupt supply lines, the U.S. military began backing South Vietnamese raids of
the North Vietnamese coast. The U.S. Navy stationed two destroyers, the Maddox
and the Turner Joy, in the Gulf of Tonkin to bolster these actions. They
reported an attack by North Vietnamese patrol boats on August 2, and a second
attack on August 4. Doubts later emerged as to whether or not the attack against
the Turner Joy had taken place.
Immediately after reports of the second attack, Johnson asked the U.S. Congress
for permission to defend U.S. forces in Southeast Asia. The Senate passed the
Gulf of Tonkin Resolution with only two opposing votes, and the House of
Representatives passed it unanimously. Congress supported the resolution with
the assumption that the president would return and seek their support before
engaging in additional escalations of the war.
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